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Abstract
In his six 1983 lectures published under the title, Fearless Speech (2001), Michel Foucault developed
the theme of free speech and its relation to frankness, truth-telling, criticism, and duty. Derived
from the ancient Greek word parrhesia, Foucault's analysis of free speech is relevant to the
mentoring of medical students. This is especially true given the educational and social need to
transform future physicians into able citizens who practice a fearless freedom of expression on
behalf of their patients, the public, the medical profession, and themselves in the public and political
arena. In this paper, we argue that Foucault's understanding of free speech, or parrhesia, should be
read as an ethical response to the American Medical Association's recent educational effort,
Initiative to Transform Medical Education (ITME): Recommendations for change in the system of medical
education (2007). In this document, the American Medical Association identifies gaps in medical
education, emphasizing the need to enhance health system safety and quality, to improve education
in training institutions, and to address the inadequacy of physician preparedness in new content
areas. These gaps, and their relationship to the ITME goal of promoting excellence in patient care
by implementing reform in the US system of medical education, call for a serious consideration and
use of Foucault's parrhesia in the way that medical students are trained and mentored.
Introduction
The American Medical Association (AMA) Council on
Medical Education has identified three areas of deficiency
that need to be addressed: (1) the need to enhance health
system safety and quality, (2) the need for enhanced
emphasis on education in training institutions, and (3)
the inadequacy of physician preparedness in necessary
content areas [1]. These areas of concern frame the AMA's
recently published Initiative to Transform Medical Education
(ITME): Recommendations for change in the system of medical
education. The explicit goal of this document is to:
Promote excellence in patient care by implementing
reform in the medical education and training contin-
uum, from pre-medical preparation and medical
school admissions through continuing physician pro-
fessional development. [1]
More specifically, however, the ITME points to a growing
gap between the emerging demands of clinical practice,
on the one hand, and the ability of the US system of med-
ical education to meet these demands, on the other. The
ITME suggests that the current system of medical educa-
tion in the US is insufficient in a number of ways. The two
main proposed outcomes of the ITME initiative are:
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The creation of a system of medical education that bet-
ter equips young physicians with the knowledge,
skills, attitudes, and values necessary to provide qual-
ity medical care and the ability to continually update
their learning; and the availability of appropriate
resources, including funding, faculty, clinical sites,
and technology to support needed changes in medical
education across the continuum. [1]
The report then makes ten recommendations in support
of these outcomes. This essay will respond in detail to
three of these recommendations (Nos. 5, 6, and 7) insofar
as they are relevant to the topic of medical mentorship in
university and clinical settings. They are as follows:
(1) Ensure that faculty at all stages of the educational
continuum are prepared to teach new content, employ
new methods of teaching and evaluation, and act as
role models for learners.
(2) Ensure that the organizational environment in
medical schools and teaching hospitals tangibly val-
ues and rewards participation in education.
(3) Ensure that the learning environment throughout
the medical education continuum is conducive to the
development of appropriate attitudes, behaviors and
values, as well as knowledge and skills. [1]
These three recommendations are, in themselves, a tall
order. How, we might ask, can those who teach medicine
best ensure that they are apt role models, that they
demonstrably value and reward meaningful participation
in the educational process, and more significantly, ensure
the transfer not just of clinical knowledge and skills, but
foremost, the attitudes, behaviors, and values appropriate
to a caring and responsible physician? With recommenda-
tions such as these, clearly the AMA is gesturing to a kind
of medical education that reaches beyond the instruction
of knowledge, skills, and information. Those who teach
medicine therefore have a dual responsibility to society:
they ought to provide society both with (1) competent
medical practitioners, and (2) able citizens. In other
words, medical faculty should teach students not only to
be capable practitioners of their art, but also to be
thoughtful, questioning professionals in regard to the
society around them.
How shall we best address these ITME challenges? This
question is all the more exigent because the physician
stands at the crossroads of power, knowledge, and tech-
nology. And in today's society, knowledge and technology
are scarcely separable from power-relations and their
effects [2]. Here, the earlier work of Foucault is helpful in
understanding power. For him, power is not a "thing," it
is not a possession that can be wielded and deployed;
instead, we find ourselves within a scientific and techno-
logical power matrix, as nodes or circuits in the perpetual
negotiation of power, politics, and knowledge. In this
sense, medical knowledge is a form of what Foucault
called "biopower," the power over the life of the biologi-
cal body. Foucault notes a proliferation of medical tech-
niques beginning in the eighteenth century, an important
historical development because medical knowledge was
able to avert some of the imminent risks of disease and
death. Foucault writes: "Power would no longer be deal-
ing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate
dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mas-
tery it would be able to exercise over them would have to
be applied at the level of life itself" [3]. This made medi-
cine a social and political concern. "For the first time in
history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in
political existence" [3]. On the one hand, biopower's con-
trol over life was effected at the level of the individual
(through what Foucault calls "anatomo-politics"), while
on the other, biopower became concerned with the
administration and regulation of biological bodies insofar
as they comprise populations (through what Foucault
calls "bio-politics"). The goal of biopolitics was – and still
is – "to rationalize the problems presented to governmen-
tal practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of
living human beings constituted as a population:
[through] health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race..."
[4]. Because the physician occupies a privileged place with
respect to power/knowledge, technologies, and popula-
tions, appropriately mentoring medical students is a cru-
cial part of their social and ethical education. Medical
students must become able citizens who not only possess
the critical skills necessary to understand how power/
knowledge operates, but they must develop the capacity
to expose and to challenge this power, when required – to
speak out fearlessly on behalf of their patients, their pro-
fession, themselves, and society in general.
In sum, medical students must learn to practice parrhesia,
they must speak fearlessly. This does not exactly mean that
they will speak without fear; rather, it means that they will
learn to have the courage to speak under fearful circum-
stances – to address and to critique those institutions or
individuals who control more power, knowledge, and
technology than the one who speaks. It means "speaking
truth to power," as Foucault has said. Such an attitude,
behavior, or value cannot exactly be "taught" as a skill or
as piece of positive knowledge. It calls for an apprentice-
ship by mentors who will foster such an ethos in their stu-
dents, who demonstrate parrhesia themselves, and who
actively encourage new discourses in their teaching, their
research, and beyond. Such a transformation would begin
to address the ITME's challenges, even if it necessitates aPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:12 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/12
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critique of the US system of medical education and of the
AMA itself.
Discussion
What is parrhesia?
Parrhesia means free speech, but it is more than this: it is
also the duty to speak in a situation in which one is not
altogether "free" to do so. It is to speak in a situation in
which one's speech carries a certain risk to one's reputa-
tion or even to one's life. Foucault writes:
Parrhesia... is linked to courage in the face of danger: it
demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of
some danger.... When you accept the parrhesiastic
game in which your own life is exposed, you are taking
up a specific relationship to yourself: you risk death to
tell the truth instead of reposing in the security of a life
where the truth goes unspoken.... Parrhesia is a form of
criticism, either towards another or towards oneself,
but always in a situation where the speaker or confes-
sor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the
interlocutor. The parrhesiastes is always less powerful
than the one with whom he speaks. [5]
We shall refer to this definition throughout the essay.
However, in a nutshell we might say that, in order for
speech to qualify as parrhesia, certain conditions must be
met – speaking out in a social situation that places the
speaker in danger or at risk because there is an imbalance
of power or status between the speaker and his or her
audience. Moreover, in the parrhesiastic  situation, the
audience does not want to hear the speech because it con-
tains a deep criticism or critique of the current order of
things, for which those in power (the audience) are some-
how responsible. It forces those in power to account for
themselves and their actions. It therefore takes great cour-
age to speak out, and yet despite the risks, the speaker
experiences a social and political duty to speak all the
same.
The concept of parrhesia helps us to contextualize the "atti-
tudes," "behaviors," and "values" mentioned in the ITME
recommendations above. As Foucault notes, the parrhesi-
astes – the one who speaks with parrhesia – is engaged in
an ethical decision. Parrhesia is a self-relation. For this rea-
son, parrhesia can also be understood as the kind of speech
I have with myself when I plainly tell myself things I do
not really want to hear, when I am faced with an agoniz-
ing decision, and I find the courage to face my fears, my
uncertainty, and to ask myself whether I am really speak-
ing or acting ethically. I risk my self in order to be myself,
authentically [6].
We might rightly ask how we know with certainty that the
one who speaks with parrhesia is a truth-teller. How do we
know the he or she possesses the truth? The modern sci-
entist (most of our readers) will logically demand some
sort of "evidence" – something that will be verifiable
according to the wisdom of the scientific method. This led
Foucault to suggest: "It appears that parrhesia, in this
Greek sense, can no longer occur in our modern epistemo-
logical framework" [5]. The self-relation of the parrhesi-
astes is, after all, first an ethical and spiritual relation, not
explicitly a relation of knowledge. But modern knowledge
is a relatively recent invention, and Foucault takes pains to
explain modern epistemology as the gradual ascendency
of mental evidence beginning roughly with Descartes in
the seventeenth century. According to Descartes, "evi-
dence" is given to consciousness without any possible
doubt when it is "clear and distinct" (omne illus verum est,
quod clare et distincte percipitur). Since Descartes, philo-
sophical and scientific thought (the two were not yet sep-
arate) asks the following question, according to Foucault:
"what... enables the subject to have access to the truth?"
[7]. The answer, if we rely on our modern epistemological
framework, is the following: "it is assumed that what gives
access to the truth, the condition for the subject's access to
the truth, is knowledge (connaissance) and knowledge
alone" [7]. The modern presumption here is that true
knowledge is mental, that "evidence" is pure – and that
true knowledge means disinterested scientific research,
ostensibly free from the body, from the emotions, and
from any other "special interests," or – to use another
modern word – from the myriad stakeholders in the pro-
duction of "truth."
Foucault's critical response to our "modern epistemologi-
cal framework" is twofold. First, he exposes the self-decep-
tive error of modern epistemology, that it could be
disinterested and free. And second, he suggests that the
concept of parrhesia would allow us to adopt and adapt an
ancient Greek wisdom that points to the ethical and spirit-
ual dimensions of the pursuit of knowledge, thus propos-
ing a model that would acknowledge the ruses of modern
epistemology while allowing us to move beyond them.
First, then, we must accept Foucault's insights concerning
power/knowledge, that knowledge is never free of power.
Foucault writes: "Truth is not out there waiting to be dis-
covered, it is created in the interest of those who exert the
most power" [8]. In the case of medicine, certainly in the
US and also in large parts of the present-day world, this is
obvious when we consider the influence of financial
rewards, our careers and promotion, government agencies
that regulate and monitor and sponsor knowledge-pro-
duction and knowledge-transfer, the myriad interests of
public policy decision-makers, the pharmaceutical indus-
try, the insurance industry, various government lobbies,
the legal-juridical complex, the convergence of research
and business interests – and the list goes on and on. Suf-
fice it to say that this is only the barest allusion to somePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:12 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/12
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ways that power and knowledge are imbricated in the sci-
entific enterprise, pointing beyond the medical contin-
uum to the real gatekeepers of scientific knowledge or
"truth." It is for this reason that Foucault speaks of a
"regime of truth" [2]. Given this nexus of power, knowl-
edge, and technology, it seems only just that we should
find ways to challenge those who wield such power, to
expose corruption, and to speak out. Rather than presume
a modern epistemological framework, and act as if we
could speak disinterestedly in the name of a true knowl-
edge that would itself be free from the vagaries of power,
parrhesia would be a kind of speech that acknowledges
this power and wrestles with it. The parrhesiastes speaks
from within the situation, and does not pretend to occupy
a space that is epistemologically neutral and free from
constraint.
The ethical and spiritual self-relation of the parrhesiastes
thus represents a compelling critique of the modern epis-
temological framework. And in a world ruled by modern
epistemology, such speech itself must be parrhesiastic!
Foucault returns us to the ancient Greeks not out of some
philosophical nostalgia; nor does he wish for a wholesale
return to a time long gone. Rather, taking parrhesia seri-
ously raises a number of difficult questions for our own
ways of knowing. Can an ethical and spiritual self-relation
still speak to us? What is parrhesia or free speech if it is an
ethical and spiritual relation, an agonistic relation?
Against the "modern epistemological framework" of phi-
losophy and science, Foucault argues that spirituality is
"the search, the practice, and experience through which
the subject carries out the necessary transformations on
himself in order to have access to the truth" [7]. Here we
must stress the transformation of the individual, which
might also be conceived as a kind of conversion. This is a
radical reversal of modern epistemology. In modern epis-
temology, we are presumed to have access to the truth;
here, in contradistinction, in order to have access to the
truth, one must struggle to stand in the correct spiritual
and ethical relation, one must be transformed. It is not
enough to have mental evidence, but the condition of pos-
sibility for access to true knowledge is the fruit of a kind of
spiritual and ethical apprenticeship. This apprenticeship
prepares the way for knowledge, and allows the individual
to transform evidence and information into meaningful
knowledge and truth. Foucault writes: "In short, in truth
and in access to the truth, there is something that fulfills
the subject himself, which fulfills or transfigures his very
being. In short, I think we can say that in and of itself an
act of knowledge could never give access to the truth
unless it was prepared, accompanied, doubled, and com-
pleted by a certain transformation of the subject" [7].
Transformation in medical schools
Medical schools, simply put, are places where teachers
and students engage in clinical work and research.
Patients must be cared for, students must be taught, fac-
ulty must publish (usually), and young, competent physi-
cians, who score well on their licensing examinations and
capture seats in "outstanding" residency training pro-
grams, must be produced. Producing such a fine product
(a premiere medical student), in addition to quality
research, allows a medical school to more effectively com-
pete against other institutions for grant monies and well-
recognized faculty candidates through an enhanced repu-
tation. Against this backdrop, in the US, the legal profes-
sion (through malpractice) and the insurance industry/
government axis (through curtailment of remuneration
and closer regulation) have allowed faculties of medicine
less latitude in what students and residents can do vis-à-
vis the patient. Increasingly, faculty members are con-
cerned that the American system of medical education
must now also teach due diligence, and must develop an
adequate response if we hope to graduate self-sufficient
practitioners (at least in their initial practice of medicine)
[9,10]. Furthermore, in the US, students enter medical
practice with a burden of debt that causes them so much
anxiety that they are often directed toward specialties or
practices that are more lucrative, even though as students
they may have preferred to do something else [11]. This is
neither good for the physician nor for the public at large.
US medical education has been transformed over the past
four decades by public discourses  initiated by the legal
community, government, insurance industry, pharmaceu-
tical firms, patients, and even medical faculties them-
selves. The power wielded by the media, government,
corporations, patient advocacy groups, etc., is real. These
transformations over recent decades have produced a truth
about US medical education that differs from the truth of
40 years ago. The ITME acknowledges some of the chal-
lenges wrought by these transformations. But how should
we respond?
We argued above that medicine is at the heart of a power/
knowledge and technology complex. Medical practice
involves power (who hires you, who pays you, who sues
you, which hospital gives you privileges and to what
extent), knowledge (board certification, locating a practice,
how to administer a practice, how patients are billed, how
procedures are done), and technology (equipment, proce-
dures, laboratory testing, and DNA counseling). Foucault
is useful for a discussion of medical education because he
demonstrates that current practices – while they appear to
be "neutral" or obviously "true" to us – nevertheless rely
on social, historical, and political contingencies. Foucault
promised a "history of the present" in his work. In other
words, when we understand how things came to be as
they are, now, we recognize that they might have beenPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:12 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/12
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otherwise; this is empowering, because it allows us to
imagine how things could be otherwise, how they could be
transformed, in the future. He writes:
The political and social processes by which Western
European societies were put in order are not very
apparent, have been forgotten, or have become habit-
ual. They are part of our most familiar landscape, and
we don't perceive them anymore. But most of them
once scandalized people. It is one of my targets to
show people that a lot of things that are part of their
landscape – that people think are universal – are the
result of some very precise historical changes. All my
analyses are against the idea of institutions and show
which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how
many changes can still be made [12].
With respect to the US system of medical education, we
have grown too used to the status quo, too used to accept-
ing as truth what is only a habit. We must try to imagine
how things could be otherwise.
Imparting parrhesiastic attitudes, behaviors, and values in
medical students is one way to give them the capacity to
challenge the status quo, to transform medical education
with an eye to the future, and to offer something practical
in our present moment. We have argued that medical stu-
dents must transform themselves into able citizens – not
just skilled technicians – and that this necessitates the use
of fearless speech throughout their careers. However, stu-
dents often cannot positively transform themselves before
they enter into practice because their experience and
knowledge is limited in this respect; moreover, the
demands and seductions of burgeoning technologies and
the nexus of power/knowledge makes authentic self-trans-
formation a Herculean task for the best of us, let alone the
uninitiated. If medical students are "released into the
wild" (medical practice) without guidance and experience
in regard to parrhesia they will not only be less able citi-
zens, but disabled citizens in regard to their ability to be
proactive, or even reactive, when confronted with issues of
significance concerning themselves, their patients, gov-
ernment, business, or society at large. In this effort, effec-
tive mentors and role models are vital. But the prospect of
transforming medical education through such mentor-
ship seems gloomy. While US medical faculties have
increased their numbers by 600% in the latter part of the
twentieth century, mentoring has deteriorated [13]. Part
of the difficulty has been that, while mentoring has been
identified as a critical step to success, too few medical stu-
dents and educators recognize its value [14].
Moreover, as most modern systems of medical education
are increasingly governed by measurable "outcomes,"
"deliverables," and "evidence-based" agendas, along with
a corporate vocabulary of "key performance indicators,"
"best practices," and the like, it is difficult to imagine how
a discourse on "attitudes," "behaviors," and "values"
could gain a foothold – let alone any discourse on "spirit-
uality"! – since these cannot be measured within our
modern epistemological framework. How would such
mentorship be implemented, counted, regulated, and
monitored? Who would be responsible, and according to
what – or whose – terms and standards? Is it not time to
have this discussion? Certainly, medical apprenticeship or
mentorship cannot be conceived as the transfer of some
positive piece of knowledge or routinely executable skill.
In this regard, Foucault speaks of three types of "master-
ship," which we might also translate as mentorship or
apprenticeship: (1) "the mastership of competence,"
where "knowledge, principles, abilities, know-how and so
on" are passed along. This first type of mastership speaks
more to the transfer of positive knowledge and skills,
while the next two relate directly to parrhesia: (2) "Master-
ship through example," where a "model of behavior" is
passed on, or even a tradition (which, etymologically,
means "to hand down"); and (3) "the Socratic mastership
of dilemma and discovery practiced through dialogue"
[7]. Socratic mastership is perhaps closest to what we
mean by parrhesia here, for Socrates is the quintessential
parrhesiastes, willing to go to his death to speak the truth.
Socrates teaches the student "that he does not know and,
at the same time, that he knows more than he thinks he
does" [7]. While this seems cryptic, the message is simple:
the limits of the student's knowledge – in our sense, the
limits of a modern epistemological framework – must be
acknowledged, but this acknowledgement is a form of
knowledge and empowerment in itself. After all, Socratic
wisdom is captured in the adage, "I know that I know
nothing." Once we admit our limitations, we are on the
road to true knowledge.
More importantly, however, Socrates teaches the student
not just how to respect the limits of his knowledge, but he
teaches the student how to relate to himself, how to care
for himself – a relation that is both a kind of practice or
exercise (askesis) and love (eros) [7]. Recall that this spirit-
ual and ethical relation is the condition of possibility of
true knowledge for the parrhesiastes. If we apply this in the
context of a medical education, while medical students
learn facts and knowledge in medical school, knowing is
not thinking. Students must evolve into thinkers who also
learn to use parrhesia as a "practice of speaking the truth
which addresses, not only the city, but the soul, the psy-
che, of the individual" [15]. This, in turn, means that the
good mentor teaches the pupil how to be a good teacher.
At the same time, while the mentor can never be a parrhe-
siastes vis-à-vis the student because the mentor is in a posi-
tion of power and authority over the student (and is not
the one at risk), like Socrates, the mentor must neverthe-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:12 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/12
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less publicly exercise parrhesia, when it is called for, in the
face of his or her superiors. While mentors may not be able
to inculcate particular moral qualities in their students, in
the very least, acting as a role model opens the possibility
for a parrhesiastic relation by demonstrating and embody-
ing sincerity in their opinions and courage in their
actions.
The good mentor demonstrates and embodies the critical
attitudes, behaviors, and values of the parrhesiates, but
more than this, she or he allows the student to practice
parrhesia  by cultivating a non-hostile environment, a
"space of appearance" [16], to exist where she or he can be
freely questioned by the student. In providing such lati-
tude to the student, the mentor not only allows the stu-
dent to learn to challenge through frank interrogation, but
at the same time the mentor will be preparing the student
to appear in society's public arena to challenge people,
laws, institutions, and government on behalf of patients,
the public's health, and the medical profession itself. Fos-
tering fearless speech will not only transform educational
systems, but will transform the individual student into a
subject who has access to the truth and who conducts
him- or herself more ethically vis-à-vis other individuals
and institutions.
Foucault makes it abundantly clear that parrhesia  is
"played" between a truth-teller and an "interlocutor" [5].
In relation to mentorship in medical schools, this means
between a faculty member and his or her medical stu-
dents. Because parrhesia involves a risk, the danger is that
the speaker tells the interlocutor the truth – a criticism
that might cause anger or perhaps even call for discipli-
nary action. As mentioned above, this criticism could be
of the interlocutor, the institution, or a criticism of the par-
rhesiastes (the student) him- or herself. In this latter case,
speakers might be confessing something they have done
wrong. This characteristic is important to cultivate in med-
ical students. If they can critique their mentors and admit
their failings (without being severely chastised), then
eventually they will acquire the ability to criticize in the
public arena and, moreover, receive criticism in return.
Finally, because the function of parrhesia, or fearless
speech, is criticism, and that such frankness, or truth-tell-
ing, can be a danger to the speaker, we come to an inevi-
table conclusion: parrhesia  is a duty  [5]. How so? The
speaker could keep silent, could lie, flatter, or try persua-
sion. But this is not the course of a parrhesiastes [5]. Here
Foucault distinguishes between the use of rhetoric for per-
suasion and the parrhesiastic desire for a direct kind of
honest speech that is non-rhetorical, unembellished. The
parrhesiastes has chosen "a specific relation to moral laws
through freedom and duty" [5]. He or she has decided
that telling the truth will help a person, people, or a situ-
ation. The duty in this situation is an obligation to articu-
late with clarity: "That is, parrhesia reveals to the listener
the listener's own truth, the listener's ethos, by speaking in
such a way that the listener is thrown back upon himself"
[15]. While the individual is free to refuse to speak, the
parrhesiastes experiences such speech as an imperative, as
ethically necessary and unavoidable. Bravely addressing
one's superiors, challenging power and authority, is a
capacity we need in tomorrow's physicians.
Fearless speech and the specific intellectual
In the past, this ability to address power and authority on
behalf of one's society was demonstrated by individuals
who were considered "universal intellectuals," i.e., those
public figures at large who wrote for, or who otherwise
expressed, the conscience of society [2]. In Foucault's
words: "the intellectual par excellence used to be the writer:
as a universal consciousness, a free subject, he was coun-
terposed to those intellectuals who were merely competent
instances in the service of the State or Capital – techni-
cians, magistrates, teachers" [2]. However, Foucault
claims that the "universal intellectual" no longer exists;
the classical left-leaning intellectual, or "spokesman of the
universal," no longer serves as the conscience of society.
Instead, this kind of intellectual has been displaced by the
"specific intellectual" who works "competently" within
specific sectors of society, "at the precise points where
their own conditions of life or work situate them (hous-
ing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the univer-
sity, family and sexual relations)" [2]. Specific
intellectuals therefore have a contingent attachment to
their profession, rather than an essential and universal
attachment to society. Specific intellectuals are experts in
a narrow field or subject matter, concerning themselves
with "specific" problems that are "non-universal." We
might find in this definition a way to characterize the phy-
sician, who is encouraged to further "specialize" in a sub-
field or particular branch of medicine.
The problem, as Foucault sees it, is that the specific intel-
lectual is too narrowly concerned – and lacks the means –
to address power and authority. And yet, the need for this
is greater than ever. Today, many technical experts, such as
physicians, sociologists, scientists, judges, and attorneys
are working in their own distinct fields: "This process
explains how, even as the writer tends to disappear as a
figurehead, the university and the academic emerge, if not
as principle elements, at least as 'exchangers', privileged
points of intersection" [2]. The writer of public conscience
has all but disappeared, and we see the rise of an intellec-
tual class, of "specification," and an increasing collusion
between power, knowledge, and technology. The univer-
sity is home to these specialists, occupying individual
silos where knowledge is produced and consumed for tinyPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:12 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/12
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segments of the population. As Foucault writes, the "spe-
cific intellectual" is:
no longer he who bears the values of all, [he who]
opposes the unjust sovereign or his ministers and
makes his cry resound beyond the grave. It is rather he
[the specific intellectual] who, along with a handful of
others, has at his disposal, whether in the service of the
State or against it, powers which can either benefit or
irrevocably destroy life. He is no longer the rhapsodist
of the eternal, but the strategist of life and death. [2]
We might say that the intellectual – increasingly only the
"specific intellectual" – has become an unwitting agent, a
node, a circuit in the exercise of biopolitical State power.
Specific intellectuals work in the service of biopower, and
are increasingly unable to levy a critique because the land-
scape is so familiar and our habits too ingrained. Foucault
wrote these words nearly a generation ago and they seem
to have come to pass. It is at this juncture where readers
may detect a warning in Foucault's narrative, as if he him-
self were an anachronism (the one who bears the values
of all and opposes the unjust), no longer comprehensible
– or just barely? – in a world governed by specific intellec-
tualism, measurable "outcomes," "deliverables," and "evi-
dence-based" agendas, along with a corporate vocabulary
of "key performance indicators," "best practices," etc. Per-
haps it is time for the ethics of fearless speech, to trans-
form specific intellectuals as those who – like the
physicians of tomorrow – will find themselves positioned
at the "privileged points of intersection," in the interstices
of power, knowledge, and technology.
The physicians of tomorrow will have an ever-greater
political responsibility, following in the footsteps of peo-
ple such as Oppenheimer, a scientist who specifically
understood the nuclear age. About sixty years ago,
Foucault writes, for the first time "the intellectual was
hounded by political powers, no longer on account of a
general discourse which he conducted, but because of the
knowledge at his disposal: it was at this level that he con-
stituted a political threat" [2]. How will our future physi-
cians navigate these waters? Here, under the pressure of
economic and political conditions (if these have not yet
merged entirely), is where fearless speech will be required.
Patients, electorates, politicians, friends and foes alike will
need to be addressed by physicians and bioethicists with
frank criticism, and truth, through an obligation of duty,
about problems and discourses that smolder, or even rage,
throughout society. Cloning, abortion, healthcare insur-
ance, healthcare access, pharmaceuticals, genetic engi-
neering, malpractice, war, famine, and politics are
engulfing the physician as specific intellectual. We need
fearless speech if we hope to develop a vocabulary that
will be adequate to the ethical challenges wrought by our
technologies. Fearless speech in the physician as a specific
intellectual is important especially in relations to political
and bureaucratic structures. Mentors should not only
teach medical students to practice parrhesia, but they
should instruct medical students that they can learn much
by allowing others (nurses, allied health care profession-
als, and patients) to speak freely towards them, too, espe-
cially when they become attending physicians. In this
way, they will begin to transform the meaning of them-
selves as "specific intellectuals."
An excellent example of fearless speech on the part of
medical students occurred at the University of Toledo Col-
lege of Medicine recently. In the autumn of 2006, the
medical student body embarked on an effort to limit
pharmaceutical company gifts and meals to faculty, resi-
dents, and students on the Health Science Campus. This
position was opposed by a number of faculty members,
administrators, and residents. However, the students were
supported by many faculty members, and by a history of
similar initiatives at other universities, as well as by the
medical literature. Through the use of fearless speech in
heated debates (both public and private), the students
were able to initiate, define, support, and dominate this
discourse. In practicing parrhesia, the students were truth-
tellers who successfully criticized the position of the status
quo held by some of the faculty, administrators, and resi-
dents (interlocutors), and within six months they ulti-
mately, and overwhelmingly, prevailed.
Conclusion: ITME, Foucault, and fearless speech
Those who represent the power/knowledge base and have
the ability to influence discourses within medical commu-
nities include broad groups that have been identified
through the ITME process: practicing physicians; medical
educators and medical management organizations; payers
and purchasers; accreditation, certification and licensure
organizations; and other health professionals (including
those in public health) [1]. The broad array of stakehold-
ers involved in this process may have differing opinions as
to the discourses necessary to effect change, or as to
whether any changes truly need to be effected. In the
words of the AMA's ITME: "Successful reform also requires
attention to factors that influence the educational process,
including faculty rewards systems, the attitudes and values
displayed by supervisors and peers as part of the learning
environment, and the financing of medical education and
health care" [1].
We began this essay as a response to three of the ITME's
recommendations for reform to the US system of medical
education. We framed the ITME recommendations as a
question of medical mentorship in the educational set-
ting: Could we imagine how new content might be taught,
how best to act as role models for learners, how to tangi-Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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bly value and reward participation in education, and how
to foster the appropriate attitudes, behaviors, and values,
as well as knowledge and skills? We answered that "imple-
menting" these reforms will be no simple task. We have
called for a parrhesiastic form of mentorship that cultivates
able citizens who are schooled in the art of critique, and
who are taught the spiritual and ethical value of speaking
out fearlessly in the face of power and authority.
Certainly we do not expect consensus on the ills of the US
system of medical education nor on the best prescription
for its improvement. We have argued, instead, that
Foucault's concept of parrhesia should be a crucial part of
medical mentorship. In their training as "specific intellec-
tuals," medical students need more than the ability to for-
mulate a differential diagnosis. They must acquire the
capacity to pursue parrhesiastic truth-telling as an activity,
an "art of life (techne tou biou)" [5]. This philosophical
problem of the twenty-first century is the same problem
Socrates and other ancient philosophers identified in the
fifth century BC: "who is able to tell the truth, about what,
with what consequences, and with what relation to
power" [5]? Medical students not only need good mentor-
ing to successfully transition into medical practice as able
practitioners, they also need an apprenticeship in trans-
formation, to become able citizens. As able citizens who
wield fearless speech, our future physicians – today's med-
ical students – will be best equipped to influence the dis-
courses in society that contribute to the creation of truth,
and to take their place as critical intellectuals who can face
"what is" while speaking and working fearlessly toward
"what can be."
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